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1 = INTRODUCTION 
The most important engineered safeguard against the release 
of radioactive materials from a nuclear power plant is the 
containment system consisting of containment shell(s) being 
sufficiently leak-tight under all circumstances including 
accidents credible to occur during the plant life» Because 
absolute leaktightness is technically not feasible, certain 
leakage will exist in all containment designs» 
Evidently, containment systems with multiple barriers will 
reduce the leakage of radioactive materials released from 
the reactor fuel due to an accident considerably. As it has 
been shown earlier^ J the amount of active material released 
and the corresponding dose equivalent which persons at the 
site around the reactor plant could receive due to a large 
accident, can be reduced by a factor of 1000 or more if a 
double containment system is being applied= It should be 
noted that the effectiveness of a double containment system 
depends strongly on the course of accident chosen as a design 
basis for the reactor plant and the containment system which 
frequently is called the "Design Basis Accident"« In particular 
the time function of pressure during the design basis accident 
in both the inner and outer containment governs the leakage 
ι 
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behaviour and subsequent release of active materials« 
Therefore the radiation hazard to the environment of a nuclear 
power plant is in the first place influenced by the course of 
the design basis accident, by the leakage properties of the 
containment system and, of course, by the inventory of radio-
active materials in the reactor« In this paper we will report 
on investigations done during the recent months to illuminate 
the interrelation between containment system, inventory of 
radioactive material and the radiation burden to the environment, 
if the activity is accidently released« Special emphasis was 
paid to the release of various fission products and fuel iso-
topes, particularly iodine and Plutonium, because of their 
representing the largest hazard potential to the environment 
of a large fast breeder reactor« The calculations were per-
formed for the case of a typical large fast sodium cooled 
breeder of 1000 MWe power which is the ultimate goal of the 
present phase of fast breeder development« 
In the following, we will (1) discuss the influence of the 
release parameters and the release models particularly the 
aerosol model on the accident doses for typical single and 
double containment systems, (2) we will show the significance 
of the decontamination of the containment atmosphere either 
by natural plate-out or by artificial means like filter 
systems, (3) draw as far as possible conclusions for the 
most effective containment system« Finally we will make some 
remarks about the most important parameters and numbers 
necessary to develop a reasonable description of the activity 
release after large accidents in fast breeders, 
2« MODE OP CALCULATION 
The calculations were carried out by means of the digital 
program MUNDO developed at Karlsruhe in the course of theses 
investigations which calculates the doses around a nuclear 
power plant due to large accidents as function of the course 
of accident, of the activity distribution in the containment 
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system following the release from the fuel, and of the 
meteorological dispersion in the atmosphere after leakage 
through the containment barriers« All the significant effects 
influencing the activity release as multiple containment sys­
tems, filter and air cleaning systems, plate-out behaviour, 
ground level or stack release can be taken into account« A 
block diagram given in figure 1 shows the lay-out and the 
capabilities of this digital program which is published else-
(2) 
wherev ' = 
To reduce the number of parameters being important in this 
context the assumptions made in size and type of the power 
plant and in the course of accident being the cause of the 
activity release were kept constant in all calculations« The 
assumptions related to the plant were the following: 
Thermal power 
Coolant 
Load factor 
In-pile time 
number of fuel batches 
Pu 239 (end of cycle) 
Pu 240 
Pu 241 
Pu 24-2 
2500 MW 
Sodium 
0«8 
600 days 
3 
2„13 to 
0.61 to 
O.O7 to 
0«03 t 
Reactor building 
Height 
Radius 
Stack height 
cylindrical 
33 m 
20 m 
75 m 
Free containment volume 
primary 8000 m' 
secondary 16000 m' 
Weather conditions 
Ground level release 
(plane source) 
Thi; weather condition is defined in 
Pasquill Ρ*' 
(3) 
* 
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Wind velocity 2 m/sec 
Stack release _ „ .,, Ώ 
(point source) Pasquill Β 
Wind velocity 2 m/sec 
The assumptions concerning the course of accident were the 
following: 
Type of accident fast nuclear excursion 
Activity release 
mechanism melting and vaporization of the fuel 
time function instantaneous 
fission gas release 100 % 
other release fractions variable 
Activity transport 
distribution homogeneous 
plate-out exponential for a limited time 
interval 
In the calculation of doses we followed the guide lines of 
the ICRP-Recommendationsv „ The largest contribution to the 
dose values is due to incorporation« Therefore, most results 
discussed in chapter 3 are incorporation doses only related 
to the corresponding organs« Although in some cases the acci­
dent doses due to release of the noble gases can reach 
remarkable values we did not take them into account to 
avoid further complication of the results« 
3= DOUBLE CONTAINMENT, RADIOACTIVE INVENTORY, RELEASE MODEL 
AND PLATE-OUT 
3=1 The important isotopes 
A number of calculations have been done to show the effec­
tiveness of a double containment system against a single 
containment« Although it is easily understood that a double 
* This weather condition is defined in i.(3) 
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containment reduces the radiation hazard to the public 
considerably the amount of reduction depends on various 
parameters changing with different reactor types« In thermal 
reactors radioactive Iodine represents the most important 
hazard potential because it is easily absorbed in the thy­
roid where it produces the thyroid dose= If we consider fast 
sodium­cooled breeder reactors radioactive Iodine represents 
likewise a major hazard potential because the Iodine built­
up is proportional to the power for thermal and fast reac­
tors« However, whereas in thermal and fast reactors the 
fission product inventory is approximately equal, the inven­
tory of heavy isotopes, particularly Plutonium, in a fast 
reactor can be 6­8 times that of a thermal reactor with 
comparable power» For instance, the reference reactor con­
sidered (chapter 2) has the following inventory: 
ï 131 
1 132 
I 133 
1 134 
I 135 
7 . 9 ■ 
11.1 
14«5 
15 = 8 
11.8 
107 Curie MPC = 3 · 
= 8 · 
= 1 « 
= 2 » 
= 4 . 
10"9 uC/cm5 
10"8 
10~8 
10~7 
10"8 
Iodine 7 = 1 108 Curie 
Pu 
Pu 
Pu 
Pu 
239 
240 
241 
242 
1 = 31 
1=31 
80 «00 
0.13 
105 Curie MPC 
Plutonium 8.3 · 106 Curi 
6 
6 
3 
6 
10 
10 
10' 
10 
-13 
-13 
■11 
-13 
It can be derived from the maximum permissible concentrations 
(MPC) in air given above in the list of important isotopes 
that, although the Plutonium activity inventory is two 
decades less than the Iodine inventory, the radiological 
hazard potential of Plutonium exceeds that of Iodine because 
of the higher biological damage effectiveness of the Pluto­
tonium isotopes. This, of course, is true only for reactors 
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with high Plutonium inventory as fast breeder reactors are= 
In thermal reactors with their small conversion rate much 
less Plutonium builds up resulting in a higher radiological 
hazard potential of Iodine than of Plutonium as far as the 
activity inventory is concerned« Since Iodine is a thyroid 
seeker and Plutonium is a bone seeker the incorporation doses 
reported in the following tables pertain to these organs« It 
should be noted that the thyroid dose is produced by radioac­
tive Iodine only, whereas in the bone dose the governing 
contribution comes from the Plutonium-isotopes with some 
smaller contribution of other fission products like Strontium 
and Cesium« 
3.2 The release models 
A number of calculations were carried out with different sets 
of release fractions to demonstrate the influence of assump­
tions made on the release of halogens and solids, particularly 
Iodine and Plutonium. The results are shown in table 1 in which 
accident doses for four different sets of release fractions as 
function of the leakage of the containment system are given. 
In the first column each line contains a set of release frac­
tions. The first number stands for the halogens, the second 
for the solids, and the third for the volatile solids. Noble 
gases are not of interest in this context because they do not 
contribute to the bone or thyroid dose. Case A represents an 
upper limit of pessimistic assumption to our present state of 
knowledge« However it should be mentioned that such a set of 
release fractions is being discussed and considered today in 
various groups related to the Division of reactor licensing 
of the USAEC. Case Β corresponds to the values of diNunno^-7' 
taking into account a factor of 5 less for the halogens be­
cause of the good trapping capability of sodium. This set of 
release fractions refers for instance to the present stage 
of the licensing procedure for the SEFOR reactor, it also 
was applied in the safety analysis of the Karlsruhe Na-2 
prototype reference design^ . Case C differs from case Β 
by assuming release fractions which correspond to the aerosol 
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model discussed in chapter 4. Such a set of release fractions 
was originally employed in the first SEFOR safety analysis but 
was later refused by the USAEC by reason of insufficient 
knowledge of the behaviour of aerosols. It should be mentioned 
however that the verification of this set of release fractions 
is the goal of the Karlsruhe aerosol program initiated in the 
recent months to investigate reactor fuel and fission product 
aerosols. Finally case D represents the aerosol model together 
with optimistic release fractions of gaseous and volatile 
fission products which could possibly be accomplished if more 
experimental data are available. 
In table 1 the plate-out behaviour, distance from the reactor 
plant, and exposure time are kept constant. It should be noted 
that the plate-out half time of 1 h for the halogens and vola-
tile solids and of 10 h for the solids are pessimistic. There-
fore the values given in table 1 represent upper limits for 
the various cases. In particular the doses of case D may be 
decreased by a factor of 2 or more if a better plate-out is 
assumed and by an additional factor of 5 if the leak rate is 
reduced to 0.1 Vol.%/day. This means that only the accident 
doses of case D for the single containment system have the 
potential to become low enough to make a single containment 
design possible for large fast sodium cooled breeders. 
3«3 PIate-out behaviour 
Beside of the leakage characteristics of the containment 
system and the release models, plate-out is of similar im-
portance which is illustrated in figure 2« Doses can be 
reduced by a few decades, particularly for exposures longer 
than 1 day, if a good plate-out behaviour of the important 
isotopes and their corresponding chemical compounds can be 
assumed. Plate-out in this context stands for both natural 
and artificial decontamination processes of the inner 
containment atmosphere« Therefore figure 2 shows also the 
importance of air cleaning methods like recirculation filter 
systems, wash-down systems or similar engineered safeguards. 
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From the case C (which corresponds to the case C of table 1) 
it can be derived that depending on the plate-out half time 
the thyroid dose or the bone dose is higher than the other. 
In figure 3 the plate-out influence for a single containment 
is presented showing even more the importance of this effect. 
Only in case C«c, i.e. the aerosol model defined in table 1 
(case C) together with a good plate-out (relatively short 
half times) the accident doses will be in the neighbourhood 
of 25 rem. 
This leads to the conclusion that not only the release fractions 
but also the plate-out characteristics of the important radio-
active isotopes under the specific accident conditions should 
be known and therefore investigated. 
3«4 Vented double containment 
The double containment system considered so far in this paper 
consists simply of two leaktight containment shells in series. 
Gaseous and volatile material from this containment system is 
released at or close to ground level where the atmospheric 
dispersion is less effective than at higher altitudes. There-
fore, the release of radioactive material through a stack leads 
to a considerable reduction of doses in the reactor vicinity. 
We have studied also this type of double containment system 
in which the outer containment volume is vented through a 
stack, therefore called the "vented double containment". An 
important parameter in the vented double containment is, of 
course, the circulation velocity by which the outer contain-
ment volume is vented. The blowers necessary to exhaust the 
air through the stack must be designed to accomplish the 
pressure differential between inside and outside. Therefore, 
depending on the in-leakage of the outer containment shell 
the air flov; pumped through the stack will vary. In table 2 
some results for a vented double containment with a 75 meter 
high stack are given. The important conclusion to be drawn 
from these numbers is the fact that for the vented double 
containment fairly small off-gas-flow rates through the 
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stack are necessary (ca. 10 Vol%/day) to achieve sufficiently 
low dose values, although the containment system can be im-
proved by increasing the stackheight and using offgas filters. 
Again the aerosol model (case C) gives sufficiently low dose 
values, if we use the 25 rem bone dose as our yardstick. 
4. THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AS AEROSOLS 
From the foregoing considerations and from the results reported 
in chapter 3 we have learned the following: 
1) The bone dose mainly produced by the release of Plutonium 
dominates all other doses in a large accident of a 2500 
MWth fast sodium cooled breeder. 
2) As long as conventional and conservative release models 
are applied only very leaktight double containment systems 
(5 Vol.%/day for the inner, and 0.5 Vol.%/day for the outer 
containment) or vented double containments with small stack 
release should be used to arrive at reasonably low accident 
doses. 
3) If release models with low release fractions for the solids 
(aerosol models) can be justified, containment requirements 
can be relaxed considerably. Double containments with 
higher leakage and even single containment systems may 
then become possible. 
The release model which we call the "aerosol model" (case C 
and case D in table 1 and 2 and in figure 2 and 3) is based 
on the following consideration: If during a large accident 
the fuel is melted and vaporized, essentially all the radio-
active inventory contained in the fuel will be released into 
the containment atmosphere= The released material will then 
cool off rapidly= Gaseous and volatile material will stay 
airborne except that fraction which is plated out. Solid 
material, however, can stay airborne only if it is recondensed 
to an aerosol like smoke or dust= Certainly this will take 
place because recondensation from the gaseous phase is a very 
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effective way to produce aerosols. 
The question is raised how much of the solid radioactive in­
ventory of the fuel will form aerosols. Although this amount 
depends on many parameters of the fuel, of the reactor, and 
of the accident conditions a rough estimate can be made 
showing the order of magnitude which is implied: The stationary 
mass concentration of an aerosol is given by the following 
equation: 
C = V s> N Ρ JP 
with V = particle volume (cnr) 
o = particle density (g/cnr) 
Ν = number of particles per volume (cm~^) 
From data on smokes created in ore mines we can estimate a 
mass concentration of around 30 milligrams/m . Assuming a 
containment volume of 10 000 m , the amount of solid material 
staying airborne would then be 0.3 kg. This corresponds to 
the fraction of 0.0001 of the 3000 kg of Plutonium inventory 
of a 25ΟΟ MWth fast sodium cooled breeder. Although this 
estimate has to be proved and verified theoretically or ex­
perimentally it can be used as a first approximation demonstra­
ting that the detailed process in the release of radioactive 
solid material from the fuel should be investigated to provide 
a more realistic picture of activity release and radiation 
burden to the reactor environment. 
Another aspect, perhaps more important, should be emphasized. 
In the aerosol model we do not ask how much active material 
is released from the fuel (release fraction), rather we ask 
how much active material can stay airborne in the containment 
atmosphere during the accident. With other words we do not 
ask for release fractions which will be subject of doubt as 
long as accident models are not sufficiently verified. We 
rather ask for aerosol behaviour and aerosol parameters which 
provide much better access to experimental investigation and 
justification. Furthermore, the aerosol model illuminates 
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which parameters are of importance in the attempt to reduce 
the amount of activity released in an accident. For instance, 
the inner containment volume is direct proportional to the 
airborne aerosol mass and therefore proportional to the 
activity able to be released through the containment system. 
This means that the inner containment volume should be 
minimized. Effectiveness of filtering and other decontami­
nating systems depend as far as solid material is concerned 
on aerosol properties. Also deposition and inhalation behaviour 
of radioactive materials depend on aerosol particle size and 
other aerosol parameters. 
We can conclude that the aerosol model is believed to provide 
muchmore realistic release data for solid materials and to 
describe much better the activity transport after large 
accidents in fast sodium cooled breeder reactors« 
5» CONCLUSIONS 
From the investigations and calculations presented the 
following conclusions may be drawn: 
1) The presently employed release models for fission products 
or fuel material (case B, or in the pessimistic version 
case A) make it definitely impossible to employ a single 
containment, except one takes the position that the here 
considered major accident is assumed to be impossible. In 
that case however virtually no containment at all is neces­
sary. 
2) The extremely conservative assumptions of case A are so 
pessimistic that also a double containment does not give 
the necessary protection. The more realistic but still 
pessimistic case Β gives satisfactory results provided 
that the leak rate of the inner containment is not larger 
then roughly 10 %. 
3) In both cases, A and B, the bone dose is the limiting dose 
and therefore Pu instead of Iodine is the limiting factor. 
ι 
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4) In case of the somewhat optimistic model C which refers 
explicitely to the properties of Pu aerosols, the limiting 
factor in some cases is Iodine, in others it is the 
Plutonium. The function of a double containment is 
satisfactory even with leakage rates of 50 % in case 
of the inner containment. 
5) Only the fairly optimistic model D making full use of 
(assumed) aerosol data not only for Pu but also for other 
isotopes gives results, which in case of a good but single 
containment come somewhat close to the permitted values. 
In changing from the non-vented double containment to 
the vented double containment it should be mentioned that 
the double containment system, which is vented, may not 
be applicable at all sites. However, if it is being applied, 
that means, if a stack is being provided, the results are 
definitely more favorable. 
6) In case of a vented double containment already the realistic 
but still pessimistic model Β gives reasonable dose rates 
provided that the rate of exchanging the air from the outer 
containment is not larger than about 100 % / day. 
The over all conclusion is now, that in view of the forthcoming 
era of 1000 MWe fast breeder reactors there is a large and well 
founded incentive to put great emphasis on the investigation 
of aerosol behaviour in the context of fast reactor accidents. 
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Table 1 : Accident doses as function of release fractions( Single and Double Containment) 
500 m downwind. exposure time = 24 h 
plate - out : TH = 1 h halogens and volatile solids 
TH = K) h solids 
Leakage of Primary Containment 
" Secondary 
(Vol.°/o/day at 1 at overpressure) 
Release 
0.5 
A 0.1 
0.5 
0.1 
Β 0.01 
0.5 
0.1 
C 0.0001 
0.5 
0.01 
D 0.0001 
0.1 
Thyroid Dose ( rem ) 
Bone Dose ( rem ) 
Thyroid Dose ( rem ) 
Bone Dose ( rem ) 
Thyroid Dose ( rem ) 
Bone Dose ( rem ) 
Thyroid Dose ( rem ) 
Bone Dose ( rem ) 
Single 
0.5 
(oo) 
(Voi. %/day) 
2650 
73 800 
530 
7420 
530 
111 
53 
82 
Double Containment System 
5 
0.5 
(Vol.°/o/day) 
0.36 
147 
0.072 
14.7 
0.072 
0.15 
0.0072 
0.15 
10 
0.5 
(Vol.°/b/day) 
1.12 
396 
0.22 
39.6 
0.22 
0.42 
0.022 
0.40 
50 
0.5 
(Vol.°/o/day) 
9.8 
3115 
1.96 
313 
1.96 
3.28 
0.197 
3.25 
10 
1 
(Vol.°/o/day) 
2.23 
792 
0.44 
79.2 
0.44 
0.83 
0.044 
0.81 
Table 2 Accident Doses for a vented double containment 
500 m downwind. exposure time 24 h . stack height 75 m 
Case Β : plate - out TH = I h halogens and volatile solids 
Case C : plate -
No filter system 
TH = 
out TH = 
TH = 
10h solids 
0.5 h halogens and volatile solids 
5 h solids 
Leakage of primary Containment 
off - gas flow secondary Containment 
(Vol. °/o of contained volume/ day 
Release 
0.1 
Β 0.01 
0.5 
0.1 
C 0.0001 
0.5 
Thyroid Dose ( rem ) 
Bone Dose ( rem ) 
Thyroid Dose (rem) 
Bone Dose (rem) 
0.5 
1000 
(Vol.°/o/day) 
3.4 
122 
1.1 
0.72 
0.5 
100 
( Vol. %/day) 
0.5 
41.5 
0.14 
0.19 
0.5 
10 
( Vol.% /day) 
0.05 
5.3 
0.014 
0.024 
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